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Constitutional Law-Annexations and the Voting Rights Act
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been praised as "the most
successful piece of civil rights legislation ever enacted by Congress."'
Designed to regulate the details of certain states' registration of voters
and voting procedures, the Voting Rights Act contains a stringent and
extraordinary provision, section five, that is intended to prevent future
attempts to evade the act.2 Jurisdictions under the purview of section
five' must gain approval from federal authorities before instituting any
1. Hearing on the Enforcement and Administration of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 as Amended Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 8, at 86 (1971) (statement of H. Glickstein, Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n
on Civil Rights). For an assessment of the progress achieved by the Voting Rights Act
see U.S. COMM'N om Crm Rxorrs, THE VoTiNa RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARs LATER
(1975).
2. Section 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970) provides:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions
set forth in 42 U.S.C. 1973b(a) based upon determinations made under the
first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek
to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or ef-
fect on November 1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with
respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title
based upon determinations made under the second sentence of section 1973b
(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting quali-
fication or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with re-
spect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, such
State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person
shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure; Provided, That such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such
proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure
has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of
such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General
has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, except
that neither the Attorney General's failure to object nor a declaratory judgment
entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement
of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any ac-
tion under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges
in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal
shall lie to the Supreme Court.
3. The initial Act applied only to states or parts of states that had literacy tests or
similar devices and in which the registration or voter turnout for 1964 was less than 50%
of the voting age population. States covered by the Act in 1965 were: Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia; forty counties of North Carolina and
several non-Southern areas. After five years a jurisdiction could terminate its coverage,
but in 1970 this period was extended to ten years. The Voting Rights Act Amendment of
1970 broadened coverage to include those states which used a literacy test and which had
less than 50% of the registration or turnout for the year 1968. Thus, after 1970 the act
also included three populous New York City boroughs: Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1970). On July 28, 1975, the Congress passed a bill extending
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changes in voting laws or procedures. 4 By virtue of section five, the
burden of proof is no longer on the voters opposing the new election
procedure; it has been shifted to the state or subdivision, which must
demonstrate that the alteration is not invidious in purpose or effect.5
In City of Richmond v. United States" the United States Supreme
Court was confronted with the issue whether an annexation that brings a
heavy influx of whites into a city and alters the racial balance to the
detriment of the black community's political influence violates section
five. Refusing to invalidate the annexation in question, the Court indi-
cated that section five is not a shield to protect pre-annexation voting
strength; instead it is to serve only as a mechanism to ensure that blacks
are afforded representation reasonably equivalent to their proportion in
the post-annexation community. 7 The Court also made clear that an
annexation tainted by the impermissible desire to abridge or deny black
voters' access to the political system is not a per se violation of section
five so long as "verifiable reasons are now demonstrable in support of
the annexation.""
The case arose as a result of the persistent efforts of :Richmond to
expand its boundaries to encompass some of the suburban areas encir-
cling it.9 Negotiations were bitter and protracted. While they dragged
on, demographic and voting changes swept the city. Blacks achieved a
majority status which, due to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, had a great
potential for being translated into political power.'0 Finally, in May
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for seven more years for those areas having a literacy test
and a less than 50% registration or voting turnout for the year 1972. Congress also
broadened the scope of the bill to include Spanish-speaking Americans and other
"language minorities." Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 203 (Aug. 6, 1975). Thus, Texas, with its
heavy concentration of Mexican-Americans and Alaska with its large native population
are now covered by section 5, in addition to parts of other states such as California and
Colorado. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1975, at 1, col. 4.
4. A voting change that is not precleared can not be enforced. Approval may be
secured by obtaining a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia that the proposed change is not discriminatory in purpose or effect
or by obtaining the assent of the Attorney General of the United States. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (1970).
5. See, e.g., Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
6. 95 S. Ct. 2296 (1975). Mr. Justice White wrote the majority opinion. Justices
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall dissented in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan.
Id. at 2308. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of this case.
7. Id. at 2304.
8. Id. at 2305 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 2300. As early as 1962, the city sought judicial approval of two
annexation ordinances, seeking to annex part of Henrico and Chesterfield Counties. In
1965 when it became apparent that an Henrico County annexation settlement would be
too costly, the city shifted its efforts to the Chesterfield County negotiations.
10. In Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228, 231-32 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd,
459 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972), the court noted, "Mhe
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1969, a compromise agreement, which called for annexation of a por-
tion of Chesterfield County, was reached between the county and the
city. A Virginia court'- approved the plan effective January 1, 1970.12
One immediate result of the annexation was a diminution in the propor-
tion of blacks in the city so that in the post-annexation, at-large elections
of 1970, they constituted forty-two percent of the total population of the
enlarged city strength, as compared to their fifty-two percent pre-an-
nexation strength.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Perkins v.
Matthews,13 the city submitted its annexation decision to the United
States Attorney General for approval in a belated attempt to conform to
the commands of section five. On May 7, 1971, sixteen months after
Richmond assumed jurisdiction over the annexed area, the Attorney
General interposed an objection to Richmond's continued use of at-large
elections. Meanwhile, a class action by black Richmond voters was filed
in federal district court in Virginia challenging the annexation on fif-
teenth amendment grounds. The district court found in favor of plain-
tiffs and ordered new city council elections.' 4 The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed.'
5
Unable to gain the Attorney General's acceptance of the plan, the
city elected to initiate an action in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the annexation was
legal.' 6 In response to another annexation ruling, City of Petersburg v.
United States,17 Richmond also developed and submitted to the Attor-
evidence shows an increase in Negro voting strength ranging from 4,000 qualified voters
in 1956 to more than 35,000 at the present time .... While in 1968 there were more
whites than Negroes registered to vote, about 50% of the registered Negroes voted as
against approximately 30% of the white registered voters."
11. The controlling Virginia statutes permit annexations only after obtaining a
favorable judgment from a three-judge annexation court. 95 S. Ct. at 2300 n.2.
12. A writ of error was refused by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Deerboume Civic and Recreation Ass'n v. City of Richmond, 210 Va. lii, cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1038 (1970).
13. 400 U.S. 379 (1971). See text accompanying note 42 infra.
14. The court found that "the purpose of the compromise agreement was to
deprive the plaintiff's class of a basic constitutional guarantee." Holt v. City of
Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228, 237 (E.D. Va. 1971).
15. 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972). The court relied
on Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1970), and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1967), to conclude that "the unconstitutional motivation [was] too remote from the
judicial annexation decree, which firmly rested on non-racial ground, to warrant a grant
of any relief." 459 F.2d at 1094. See Note, Constitutional Law-Municipal Boundary
Changes and the Fifteenth Amendment, 51 N.C.L. Rav. 573 (1973).
16. See note 4 supra.
17. 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973). See text
accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
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ney General various plans attempting to "neutralize to the extent possi-
ble any adverse effect [of annexation] upon the political participation
of black voters."' The Attorney General indicated that one of the plans
was satisfactory, and it was subsequently submitted to the district court
in the form of a consent judgment. 9
The matter was referred to a special master who concluded that the
city had failed to meet its burden of proof that the annexation, even as
modified, did not have the purpose or effect of diluting the black vote of
that city.20 The master's findings indicated that the white political
leadership was fearful that without an influx of whites into the city,
black voters would be able to elect a majority to the City Council in the
1970 elections.2" The master emphasized that the city had not demon-
strated any acceptable counter-balancing economic and administrative
benefits to support the annexation22 and. that the city had failed to
minimize to the greatest extent possible the diluting effect of its action.2s
The district court, finding these conclusions to be compelled by the
record before the master, declined to grant Richmond a declaratory
judgment.24
On appeal, 5 the Supreme Court held that cities under the jurisdic-
tion of section five can alter their racial composition by annexing
predominantly white suburbs so long as blacks enjoy a proportionate
share of power in the enlarged city.2 6 The Court accepted the district
court's finding that the annexation, as it was carried out in 1969, was
infected by the impermissible purpose of denying the voting rights of
black citizens. Nevertheless, the Court was persuaded that section five
could be satisfied by the adoption of a fair ward plan, provided that
verifiable reasons could now be presented in favor of the annexation. 8
18. Id. at 1031.
19. The nine-ward plan finally submitted by the city was composed of four wards
which were heavily black, four wards which were predominantly white, and a "swing"
ward which had a black population of 40.9 percent. 95 S. Ct. at 2304.
20. City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1346 (D.D.C. 1974).
21. Id. at 1349.
22. Id. at 1353.
23. Id. at 1356-57.
24. Id. at 1346.
25. See note 2 supra.
26. 95 S. Ct. at 2304.
27. Id. at 2305.
28. Id. The Court remanded on this issue for the purpose of bringing up to date
and reassessing the evidence. Justice White stated, "We are not satisfied that the Special
Master and the District Court gave adequate consideration to the evidence in this case in
deciding whether there are now justifiable reasons for the annexation which took place
January 1, 1970." Id. at 2306.
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Rejecting the district court's demand for a ward plan that would protect
pre-annexation black voting strength, the Court pointed out that this
requirement would necessarily entail an abridgment of other citizens'
voting rights in the enlarged city. 29 The majority was concerned that an
overly strict interpretation of section five would effectively preclude
cities from entering into otherwise legitimate and perhaps desperately
needed annexations.3 0 The Court was unwilling to believe that Congress
intended such a result.31
In order to put the Court's holding in appropriate perspective, it is
necessary to examine briefly the evolution of section five's interpretation
prior to Richmond. The Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach3 2 upheld the constitutionality of section five. It noted that the
suspension of new voting regulations might have been "an uncommon
exercise of congressional power" but concluded that "exceptional condi-
tions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.13 En-
forcement of section five, however, was more difficult than the Court's
facile resolution of the constitutional issues indicated it would be. Juris-
dictions under the purview of section five were uncertain of its scope
and wary of unnecessary compliance. 4 The Attorney General ques-
tioned its workability and failed to adequately promote its enforce-
ment. 5 It was obvious that without further direction from the Supreme
Court section five would become largely dormant.
Allen v. State Board of Elections36 provided the necessary impetus
and paved the way for the full impact of section five to be felt. In that
case Chief Justice Warren declared that Congress intended section five
to be given the broadest possible scope and that consequently the Act
encompassed "any state enactment which altered the election law of a
29. Id. at 2304.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
33. Id. at 334.
34. During the first three years only South Carolina made any pretense of
compliance with section five; it submitted 118 voting changes to the Attorney General
while all the other states and subdivisions combined submitted only two changes. See
H.R. RP. No. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975).
35. See Hearings on the Extension of the Voting Rights Act Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 169 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on Extension].
36. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Allen involved four instances where states passed new
laws or issued new regulations affecting voting or registration. These changes included
at-large requirements; switches from elective to appointive office; a statute making it
more difficult for independent candidates to run for office by increasing the number of
required signatures, shortening the times, and adding other inconvenient requirements;
and a state regulation governing assistance to illiterate voters. All four cases were found
[Vol. 54210
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covered state in even a minor way." 7 This broad interpretation of the
Act was reinforced when Congress extended the Act in 1970 and
resisted vigorous attempts by some of the affected states to repeal the
preclearance provisions of section five.3 8 Accepting this clear mandate,
the Justice Department promulgated regulations for the enforcement of
section five and initiated energetic efforts to ensure compliance.
3 9
In another important section five decision, Georgia v. United
States,4 the Court confirmed that "the very effect of section five was to
shift the burden of proof with respect to racial discrimination in vot-
ing. '41 A three-judge district court for the District of Columbia empha-
sized in City of Petersburg v. United States that this burden is a heavy
one for a community with a long history of block racial voting, in a state
with a history of past racial discrimination.42
In Perkins v. Matthews3 the Court for the first time held that
changing boundary lines by annexation fell squarely within the scope of
to have the potential for diluting black voting power, and therefore before these changes
could have legal effect, they would have to be approved under the section five preclear-
ance procedures. Id. at 571.
37. Id. at 566.
38. Hearings on Extension, supra note 34, at 169. In Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526, 533 (1973), the Court noted, "Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation
of § 5 in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. After extensive
deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during which the Allen
case was repeatedly discussed, the Act was extended for five years, without any
substantive modification of § 5. . . . We can only conclude, then, that Allen correctly
interpreted the congressional design."
39. The Attorney General has interposed objections, at the state and local level, to
at-large requirements, polling place changes, majority vote requirements, staggered terms,
increased candidate filing fees, redistricting, switches from elective and appointive
offices, multimember districts and annexations. "Although 4,476 voting changes have
been submitted under § 5 since 1965, between 1965 and 1969 the number of changes
submitted was only 323 or 7% of all the department has received. About 93% of all
changes have been submitted since 1970. The year 1971 was the peak year for changes
reviewed (1118) and objections entered (50), a natural occurrence in light of upcoming
elections and redistrictings following the 1970 census. The past three years, however,
have continued to require the Department to review a high number of changes (between
850 and 1,000 a year.)" Hearings on Extension, supra note 34, at 25 (testimony of
Stanley Pottinger, Ass't Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep't of Justice).
40. 411 U.S. 526 (1973). In this case which involves the 1972 reapportionment
plan for the Georgia House of Representatives, the state of Georgia challenged the
Attorney General's regulations which placed the burden of proof on the States under
section five. The Court held that reapportionment is within the ambit of section five and
that the states have the burden of proof under section five. Id. at-535, 538.
41. Id. at 538. See 28 C.F.R. 51.19 (1974) which states, "If the evidence as to the
purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attorney General is unable to
resolve the conflict within the sixty-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-
described burden of proof applicable in the District Court, enter an objection and so
notify the submitting authority."
42. 354 F. Supp. at 1027.
43. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
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section five. The Court noted that annexations have a potential to
abridge or deny the vote, since
(1) by including certain voters within the city and leaving others
outside, it determines who may vote in the municipal election and
who may not; (2) it dilutes the weight of the voters to whom the
franchise was limited before the annexations and "the right of
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the
free exercise of the franchise."'44
The standard of proof demanded of a municipality before its
annexation would be approved was not made clear by the statute or by
the Perkins decision. The District Court for the District of Columbia
struggled to formulate a workable test to determine when an annexation
can be approved and when it should be declared discriminatory under
section five.4 5 Although Perkins left no doubt that annexations have the
potential for denying or abridging the vote, no decision has held that
annexations per se are violative of the act. In City of Petersburg v.
United States a three-judge District of Columbia court concluded that
the city's annexation in the context of at-large elections would serve to
dilute the black vote. 46 The court advised that in such circumstances
approval would be denied until "modifications calculated to neutralize
to the extent possible any adverse effect upon the political participation
of black voters are adopted, i.e., that the plaintiff shift from an at-large
to a ward system of electing its city councilmen. 47
The three-judge District of Columbia court in the Richmond case
purported to subscribe to the Petersburg test, but in the process extend-
ed it considerably. Interpreting section five as a mandate to preserve and
protect the present potential for black voting strength, they viewed as
discriminatory any annexation that diminished that strength.4
The Supreme Court in Richmond settled the confusion which the
two District of Columbia district court decisions may have generated.
Over sharp objections from the dissent, the majority stated that focusing
upon present minority strength is not the proper approach in the case of
44. Id. at 388, quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1963).
45. Under section five, a District of Columbia three-judge court has the responsi-
bility to determine whether a standard, practice, or procedure has the purpose or the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Since the
composition of these three-judge courts is not static, the district court opinions may
vary until the Supreme Court addresses the issue in question. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970).
46. 354 F. Supp. at 1028-29.
47. Id. at 1031.
48. 376 F. Supp. at 1348. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, insisted that
this was the correct application of Perkins. 95 S. Ct. at 2311.
212 [Vol. 54
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annexation.49 It rejected this approach on the grounds that it would
effectively preclude annexations from occurring or would invidiously
dilute the voting strength of other racial groups in the community. 0 Ther
majority focused instead on preserving and protecting voting rights in
the enlarged boundaries after annexation.51
The Court's approach was based on pragmatic considerations. It
proceeded from the presumption that annexations are a legitimate gov-
ernmental option for cities faced with such problems as a declining tax
base and a rising demand for services. Accordingly, the Court devised a
test that does nothing to inhibit this option. A city seeking to enlarge its
boundaries need only ensure that the electoral system used after annexa-
tion be one calculated to give the black community a voting strength
most nearly proportionate to its numbers in the new city.5z ,Richmond in
effect allows dilution when accomplished through annexation, 53 but it
rationalized this result by declaring, "[A] different city council and an
enlarged city are involved after the annexation.
54
In delineating the principles that should govern the application of
section five, insofar as it forbids voting changes having a discriminatory
effect on the voting rights of blacks, Richmond appears to be a signifi-
cant departure from Perkins. In Perkins the Court reasoned that annex-
ation has the potential to abridge the vote of black citizens since "it
dilutes the weight of the votes of the voters to whom the franchise was
limited before the annexation." 55 In Richmond the court no longer was
concerned with the voting patterns before annexation, apparently believ-
ing that a fair ward plan after the annexation was all that was necessary
to ensure effective minority representation.56
This reliance on a ward system is not an entirely satisfactory
remedy for a minority group fast approaching majority status in a
community. The ward plan can be objected to on at least three grounds.
First, while four representatives on a city council of nine is a solid base
from which to voice dissent, it is not tantamount to wielding effective
power. "[B]lacks would have a greater opportunity to elect five council-
men responsive to their concerns and interests in an at-large system






55. 400 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added).
56. 95 S. Ct. at 2304.
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within Richmond's old boundaries than in a ward system operating
within the expanded boundaries.157 Secondly, if demographic trends of
the last decade continue, blacks can shortly anticipate attaining majori-
ty status despite the recent addition of whites by the annexation. Majori-
ty status alone, however, will not bring with it the advantages that would
result from the combination of that status with an at-large voting system.
Thus, annexation will not only deprive blacks of the probability of
immediate power, it will also ensure that the white community will be
guaranteed maximum representation if the blacks attain majority status
at a later date. A third objection is that, whereas an at-large electoral
system tends to reward those candidates who appeal to the broadest
spectrum of the community, a ward system typically serves to reward
those candidates who reflect the interests of their district. Thus, an un-
intended consequence of a court-imposed ward system may be an in-
tensification of racial bloc voting, which can very well result in height-
ened racial tension. 58
The second prong of any section five inquiry is whether the pro-
posed voting change has been adopted for the purpose of denying or
abridging the voting rights of blacks.59 In Richmond, the Court was
presented for the first time with a district court finding that the purpose
of a voting change was violative of section five. Unable to completely
ignore the clear mandate of the Voting Rights Act concerning invidious
purpose, the Court stated, "An official action, whether an annexation or
otherwise, taken for the purpose of discriminating against Negroes on
account of their race has no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or
under the statute."6
The Court, however, was not convinced that a strict enforcement of
the "purpose" clause would be satisfactory. Concerned that the imper-
missible intent of a few might become a vehicle for denying a boundary
change needed for the health of the entire municipality, the Court
adopted a "verifiable justification" standard by which purpose becomes
determinative only if no countervailing economic and administrative
benefits can be demonstrated to be a product of the annexation."1
Impermissible motivation serves simply to trigger a demand for a legiti-
mate reason for the action.
57. 376 F. Supp. at 1355-56.
58. Cf. LaPonce, The Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System, 10 W. POL.
Q. 318, 330-31 (1957).
59. See note 2 supra.
60. 95 S. Ct. at 2307.
61. Id. at 2308.
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Minority citizens who attempt to challenge voting changes on
fifteenth amendment grounds, as in Holt, often find the burden of proof
placed on them to be an insurmountable obstacle.62 As one commenta-
tor has noted, "[The Supreme Court has applied the fifteenth amend-
ment to strike down discriminatory measures in only eight cases in a
century." 68 In recognition of the futility of the litigation method of
securing voting rights, the Voting Rights Act shifted the burden of
proof. The legislative intent was clearly to make this burden of proof6 4 a
formidable hurdle for those areas under the jurisdiction of section five.
However, after Richmond, states and municipalities are unlikely to
experience undue difficulty in sustaining the burden of proving that the
purpose of the annexation was not illegal under section five.6"
A municipality now has the option of proving that impermissible
purposes were not originally present or presenting compelling current
economic and administrative justifications for the annexation. Given the
difficulty of ascertaining improper motivations66 and the multitude of
verifiable, legitimate purposes which may plausibly accompany an an-
nexation, it is now highly unlikely that municipalities wil fail to meet
the burden of proof on this issue.
The Voting Rights Act has often been praised for its deterrent effect
in preventing invidious election changes and in inhibiting those maneu-
vers that were typically used in the past to deny or abridge the voting
rights of blacks.67 Justice Brennan, in the dissenting opinion, wrote that
"[t]o hold that an annexation agreement reached under such circum-
stances can be validated by objective economic justifications offered
many years after the fact, in my view, wholly negates the prophylactic
purpose of §5.' o68 Government officials in the areas affected by the Act
may be less hesitant in circumventing the letter of the law in the belief
62. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
63. Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAli. L. Ray. 523,
561 (1973).
64. See note 2 supra.
65. Congressman McCulloch, ranking minority member of the House Judiciary
Committee, stated, "The burden of proof under section 5 is rightfully placed upon the
jurisdiction to show that the new voting law or procedure is not discriminatory. As in tort
law, when circumstances give rise to an inference that there has been misconduct, the
party that has access to the facts is called upon to rebut the inference and show that its
conduct was proper." 115 CONG. Ruc. 38,486 (1969). Accord, 116 CoNo. RuE. 6154
(1970) (Statement of Senator Fong).
66. E.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968). For an excellent discussion of this problem see Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. 1205 (1970).
67. E.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966).
68. 95 S. Ct. at 2310 (dissenting opinion).
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that an ex post facto justification will suffice if judicial action is initiated
under section five.6
9
The Court's pragmatic approach to annexations is not without
merit. The attainment of power by blacks in a city that is no longer
economically viable is an empty victory. However, in its eagerness to
afford relief to beleaguered cities, the Court seriously undercut the
power of section five. The burden of proof concerning the question of
discriminatory purpose has become meaningless. By ignoring pre-annex-
ation minority political influence, the Court has invited that influence to
be diluted. Politicians in the states and subdivisions covered by section
five can no longer successfully prevent blacks from voting. However,
annexations may become one method of preventing blacks from winning
or deciding elections. The promise of full voting rights is an elusive one
if it is subject to manipulations of this kind. In the wake of the violence
at Selma, Alabama, President Johnson urged Congress to enact voting
rights legislation. The President stated, "No law we now have on the
books . .. can ensure the right to vote when local officials are
determined to deny it." °70 The Richmond decision serves notice to local
officials determined to prevent blacks from wielding real power that
there is now no law that prevents annexations from being used to dilute
the political influence of blacks.
BRIAN A. POvERS
Constitutional Law-The Establishment Clause: Drawing the
Line on Aid to Religious Schools
Since its first ruling on an establishment clause1 challenge to state
aid to religious schools,' the United States Supreme Court has sought to
69. Annexations are often viewed as a safety valve for our larger cities. This
decision will also affect much smaller cities eager to add white voters for their tax dollars
and their votes. Perkins involved the expansion efforts of Canton, Mississippi, a town
with a 1970 census of 10,703; Petersburg involved Petersburg, Virginia, a city with a
1970 population of 36,103.
70. See Hearings on Extension, supra note 34, at 5.
1. The establishment clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ..... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The establishment clause was
presumed applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment in Everson, supra at 15,
and has subsequently been expressly applied to the states. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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